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A REGULATORY RETREAT: ENERGY MARKET
EXEMPTION FROM PRIVATE ANTIMANIPULATION ACTIONS UNDER THE
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
Meric Sar*
In order to facilitate greater reform in energy markets, Dodd-Frank
granted the CFTC wide-ranging powers as part of the greater mandate
given to the CFTC in relation to OTC-swaps and the daily derivatives
trading activity in commodities futures and options markets. As a
result, Dodd-Frank subjected electricity market transactions—which
traditionally occur under the oversight of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission in markets organized around independent
system operators and regional transmission organizations—to the
anti-manipulation prohibitions of the Commodity Exchange Act.
Thus, differently from FERC’s regime, the post-Dodd-Frank statutory
framework opened the way for enforcement of market discipline in
electricity markets through a private right of action under Section 22
of the CEA. This development drew strong opposition from the
industry, and also caused a conflict between courts and the CFTC in
the interpretation of the relevant law. In October of 2016, the CFTC
stepped back by issuing a final exemptive order to the participants of
seven national energy markets, which constitute almost the entire U.S.
wholesale electricity market. The withdrawal of the private right of
action conflicts with the position previously advocated by the CFTC
itself. It also raises questions about the CFTC’s use of its exemptive
powers, as the removal of a statutory right through agency rulemaking
may potentially be in conflict with the text and statutory purpose of
the CEA as amended by Dodd-Frank. The exemption not only
removes an important tool in enforcing market discipline, but also has
the potential to undermine the reform efforts in the transition of U.S.
energy markets to a smart grid. This Note will provide a history of the
developments that have unfolded since the enactment of Dodd-Frank

* Istanbul University, LL.B.; Georgetown, LL.M.; Fordham, J.D.; member of New York
and Istanbul bar associations. The author wants to thank Professor Caroline Gentile for
her valuable comments and guidance. The author has worked as a legal extern at U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Division of Enforcement and Whistleblower
Office. All errors found and opinions expressed herein belong solely to the author, and
do not in any way convey or represent any official interpretation of the agency’s staff.
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in relation to the availability of a private right of action under the CEA
in energy markets. The Note also analyzes commonly raised
arguments against the availability of a private right of action and
presents the various counter-arguments.
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INTRODUCTION
An often overlooked yet important reform opportunity introduced by
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) relates to the regulatory landscape surrounding energy
and power markets,1 where the supply and demand forces in the interstate
electricity infrastructure meet on a daily basis to settle various
transactions on energy, capacity, and transmission rights.2 In the last two
decades, recognizing the urgent need to improve efficiency and usher
transformation in the energy grid against rapid developments in
technology, Congress understood the importance of price integrity in the
energy markets and resolved to eliminate trading practices that have a
detrimental effect on the price formation process in the energy markets,
which often put innovative enterprises at a disadvantage against the

1. See generally Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and
States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507 (2004) (“Energy policy has been a primary domestic
news story during the last two years: the Enron scandal, terrorist threats against nuclear
power plants, the California electric energy market collapse, and the August 14, 2003
blackout affecting fifty million people in the eastern United States. Electric energy,
although seldom analyzed in the literature, especially compared to the column inches
devoted to the geopolitical role of oil, is the critical resource underwriting the modern
post-industrial economy. Without adequate and reliable electric energy, the computer
age, the information society, many industrial processes, and even high-rise or moderate
height buildings would be impossible. Electric power is the critical energy input in the
American economy.”).
2. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power
Plants,” and the Smart Grid, 7 ENVT’L & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 191, 193 (2012) (“Given
the urgency to address climate change, [Distributed Energy Resources (‘DERs’)] have
become especially important as part of a portfolio of solutions to reduce fossil fuel use .
. . in the electricity sector of the economy and adapt to the changing climate. The
transition from reliance on large power plants to DERs must ‘occur rapidly to avert
potentially catastrophic environmental effects.’ DERs help the electric grid by increasing
grid reliability and resilience, making the grid less vulnerable to prolonged power
failures. They can also reduce energy delivery losses, and reduce emissions of
conventional pollutants. Beyond the environmental and energy advantages, there are
social benefits, such as widespread decentralized ownership of DG facilities to empower
consumers.” (citations omitted)); Paul L. Joskow, Creating a Smarter U.S.
Electricity Grid, 26 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 29, 30 (2012) (“[A] smart grid may be needed
if solar, wind, geothermal, and other renewable energy technologies are to make a sizable
contribution to national electricity needs.”).
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legacy energy industry.3 Dodd-Frank granted the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) wide-ranging powers over energy
markets within the greater mandate given to the CFTC to reform OTCswaps and daily derivatives trading activity occurring in commodities
futures and options markets.4 As a result, Dodd-Frank brought electricity
market transactions—traditionally under the oversight of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)—additionally under the antifraud/manipulation prohibitions of the Commodities Exchange Act
(“CEA”).5 In contrast to the pre-existing FERC regime, the reformed CEA
also allows private enforcement of market discipline in these markets
under Section 22, which explicitly recognizes a private right of action
against fraudulent and manipulative conduct occurring in all commodities
markets.6 The availability of a private right of action has been widely
opposed by the energy industry on the grounds of regulatory overreach.7
After several years of regulatory and legal uncertainty resulting from
conflicting judicial and administrative actions, in October 2016 the CFTC
issued a final exemptive order to the participants of seven national energy
markets, which constitute almost the entirety of wholesale U.S. electricity

3.

See generally JOHN G. KASSAKIAN ET AL., MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE
GRID 20 (2011) (noting that Section 1301 of the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 defines the Smart Grid in thirteen different objectives that make
up “a broad collection of ambitious goals,” citing 42 U.S.C. § 17381); Joseph T. Kelliher
& Marie Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal Energy Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV.
611, 613 (2009) (“Part II of the Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act have changed
from a regulatory scheme that controlled market power exercise by utilities, pipelines,
and producers through classic rate regulation to a regulatory regime that controls the
exercise of market power through reliance on a mixture of competition and regulation.”).
4. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Minimum margin rules, registration, and reporting
requirements comprise the majority of the CFTC reforms introduced by Dodd-Frank in
relation to swap contracts. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
5. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5) (2012).
6. 7 U.S.C. § 25. FERC’s enforcement statute does not provide a private right of
action. The proposal in this regard was rejected by Congress during the reforms in 2000s.
7. David Perlman et al., CFTC Proposal Creates Jurisdictional Controversy and
Uncertainty in the RTO and ISO Markets, BRACEWELL (May 19, 2016), http://energylega
lblog.com/blog/2016/05/19/cftc-proposal-creates-jurisdictional-controversy-and-uncerta
inty-rto-and-iso-markets [https://perma.cc/844H-BN4H].
OF THE ELECTRIC
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markets.8 In effect, the order withdrew the statutory right of market
participants to bring lawsuits against manipulative and disruptive trading
practices in the relevant electricity markets.9 Although the CFTC
continues to reserve its anti-manipulation enforcement authority in
relation to these markets, the CFTC’s final order is remarkable, as it
represents a retreat by the agency.10 This conflicts with its prior actions,
which had endorsed the availability of private rights of action under the
CEA for the participants of the exempted markets under various statutory
and policy grounds.11
The elimination of private enforcement is likely to undermine market
discipline in electricity markets. FERC’s statutory authority over antimanipulative conduct is limited and lags behind the emerging norms in
commodities and securities laws in relation to contemporary issues such
as hyper-frequency trading.12 Even if the CFTC continues to have antimanipulation enforcement power over the exempted electricity markets,
it is questionable whether, from a practical standpoint, the CEA’s antimanipulation provisions will have a wide reach over the exempted
markets. This is for reasons such as the CFTC’s limited enforcement
resources and the likelihood of greater deference by the CFTC to FERC
in recognition of FERC’s role as the primary regulatory body in the
energy markets.
This Note aims to provide an account of the regulatory and judicial
developments that have unfolded since the enactment of Dodd-Frank in
relation to the availability of private rights of action under the CEA in
energy markets. First, the Note will articulate the regulatory authority of
the CFTC under the CEA, including under the relevant CEA antimanipulation provisions as amended by Dodd-Frank, and as applicable to
electricity markets. Second, this Note will delineate the energy market8. Final Order Regarding Southwest Power Pool, Inc. Application to Exempt
Specified Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,062 (Oct. 24, 2016).
9. See id.
10. CFTC, Q & A–FINAL ORDER ON RTO AND ISO EXEMPTION FOR CERTAIN
SPECIFIED TRANSACTIONS (2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/
documents/file/rto_iso_qa_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J5J-NHTF].
11. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Order and Request for Comment on an Application
for an Exemptive Order From Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (May 21,
2015).
12. See Antony E. Ghee, FERC Does Not Have Anti-Manipulation Authority in
Financial Markets, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 379 (2013); Jody Freeman & David
B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 63 (2014); Gregory
Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and “Front Running” in
the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607 (2015).
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related exemptions granted by the CFTC after the adoption of DoddFrank and the interesting developments in the relevant rulemaking
process. Courts’ interpretation of the relevant CFTC rulemaking, which
created a tension with the CFTC’s own interpretation regarding the
availability of a private right of action in energy markets under Section
22 of the CEA, will also be analyzed.
Lastly, the Note will address the commonly raised arguments against
the availability of private rights of action and present various counterarguments based on the CEA’s statutory authority, administrative law
policy, and market theory.
I. CEA AS AMENDED BY DODD-FRANK AND THE CFTC’S REGULATORY
AUTHORITY OVER ENERGY MARKETS
Dodd-Frank expanded the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction—which
had included futures—to also cover swaps that are traded, executed or
cleared on exchanges or clearinghouses.13 Prior to Dodd-Frank, energy
products were generally accepted as “exempt commodities”14 under the
CEA.15 Amendments under Dodd-Frank eliminated the pre-existing
regulatory exemption for “exempt commodities,” which exempted swap
trading by sophisticated counterparties in certain commodities (i.e.,
energy and metals products) from the entirety of the CEA, except for the
13.
14.

7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2012).
An “exempt commodity” is defined as any “commodity that is not an excluded
commodity or an agricultural commodity.” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(20) (2012).
15. See Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg.
21,286, 21,294 (1993) (“The Commission . . . hereby exempts from all provisions of the
[CEA] . . . except [provisions prohibiting manipulation of the market place of any
commodity] in interstate commerce or for future delivery . . . [c]ontracts for the purchase
and sale of crude oil, condensates, natural gas, natural gas liquids . . . .”). The energy
exemption applied to transactions. Id. Even pre-Dodd-Frank, CFTC continued to exert
anti-manipulation authority over non-transactional activities such as false advertising and
reporting. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Reed, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1190,
1198 (D. Colo. 2007) (“[B]y their terms, the exemptions are limited to contracts,
agreements, or transactions. ‘Each of these terms [contracts, agreements and
transactions], as commonly understood, denotes a mutual understanding between parties
creating rights or obligations that are enforceable or are recognized at law.’ The illegal
activity alleged in the Complaint—false reporting of market information concerning
natural gas and attempted manipulation of natural gas price indices does not implicate an
‘agreement, contract or transaction.’” (citations omitted)).
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anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions.16 Subsequently, the CFTC
refused to issue grandfather relief with regards to the statutory “exempt
commodities” exemption. Instead, it addressed the relevant swap activity
by studying particular markets in detail and issuing rules and exemptions
as tasked by Dodd-Frank.17
A. ENERGY TRANSACTIONS AS FUTURES AND SWAPS UNDER CEA
The CFTC has “exclusive” jurisdiction over “accounts, agreements
(including . . . ‘option[s]’ . . .) . . . and transactions involving swaps or
contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery.”18 In determining
16. Notice Regarding the Treatment of Petitions Seeking Grandfather Relief for
Trading Activity Done in Reliance Upon Section 2(h)(1)–(2) of the Commodity
Exchange Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,512 (Sept. 16, 2010); Press Release, CFTC, CFTC
Determines to Not Issue Grandfather Relief for Bilateral Exempt Commodity Swaps at
This Time; Commits to Using Available Exemptive Authorities in the Future (Sept. 10,
2010), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5890-10 [https://perma.cc/Z8J
Q-6AT3].
17. 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,513 (“The Commission is aware of the transformational nature
of [Dodd-Frank] and its potential impact on the swaps industry. The Commission also
recognizes that bilateral swaps trading activity currently conducted in reliance upon the
CEA’s Exempt Commodity Exemption will likely become subject to any number of
regulatory provisions implementing the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act, including
business conduct standards, recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and capital and
margin requirements. Until the contents and timing of the Commission’s regulations
affecting bilateral swaps are better known, however, the Commission has determined not
to grant grandfather relief as it is impossible to know at this time whether such relief will
be necessary.”).
18. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2012). Sections 2(a)(I)(i) and 2(a)(I)(ii) of the CEA
include declarations reinforcing both the FERC’s and the CFTC’s authority on energy
market transactions, but they fail to draw a clear line except declaring absolute CFTC
authority over transactions not occurring in a “trading facility that is not owned or
operated by a regional transmission organization or independent system operator . . . .” 7
U.S.C. § 2(a)(I)(ii)(II) (2012); see also Hunter v. F.E.R.C., 711 F.3d 155, 159 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (“[I]f a scheme, such as manipulation, involves buying or selling commodity
futures contracts, CEA section 2(a)(1)(A) vests the CFTC with jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other agencies.”). FERC generally has jurisdiction over the interstate
transmission of electric energy, national interconnectivity, and the interstate wholesale
electric markets. With regards to futures contracts, FERC generally claims jurisdiction
over transactions that result in physical delivery. See DC Energy, LLC, 138 FERC ¶
61,165 (2012) (requiring transactions to have “the potential for a physical transfer of
energy” for FERC jurisdiction); Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 96 FERC ¶ 63,044 (2001);
N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 74 FERC ¶ 61,311 (1996) (holding that electricity futures
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whether a transaction constitutes a futures contract, the CFTC and the
courts generally analyze the transaction “as a whole with a critical eye
toward its underlying purpose.”19 In order to be legally enforceable,
Section 4 of the CEA requires futures contracts to be traded on a
commodity exchange that is designated as a contract market and
registered as such with the CFTC.20
Although the CEA does not define the elements of a futures contract,
Section 1(a)(27) provides that “[t]he term ‘future delivery’ does not
include any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or
delivery.”21 Section 2(c)(2)(D)(ii)(III)(aa) excludes from the jurisdiction
of the CFTC “forward contracts”—defined as any sale that results in
“actual delivery within 28 days.”22 Under the CEA, delivery usually
requires “[t]he formal act of transferring something,” and thus requires
handing over both possession and control of the underlying commodity.23
Thus, exclusion from the CEA’s application requires an energy market
transaction to meet either the definition of a “forward” contract that
provides for deferred shipment, or “delivery” within the meaning as set
forth by the CEA and the CFTC regulations, or to qualify for another
exception or exemption provided by the CFTC.24
approved for trading by CFTC are not securities within the meaning of section 3(16) of
the Federal Power Act, unless such a contract “goes to delivery, the electric energy sold
under the contract will be resold in interstate commerce, and the seller is a public utility”).
19. CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Grp., Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1982).
20. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012).
21. Id. § 1a(27).
22. Id. § 2(c)(2)(D)(ii)(III)(aa).
23. CFTC v. Hunter Wise Commodities, LLC, 749 F.3d 967, 978-79 (11th Cir.
2014); see also CFTC v. Int’l Fin. Servs. Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 482, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (“The quintessential difference between futures contracts . . . and spot and forward
contracts . . . is that the latter two contemplate actual exchange (delivery and receipt) of
the commodity, whether immediately . . . or at some fixed future date. By contrast,
individuals enter into futures contracts, almost without exception, solely to speculate on
the fluctuations in various commodities prices.”).
24. See Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions, 55 Fed. Reg.
39,188 (Sept. 25, 1990). The “Brent Interpretation,” developed by the CFTC in 1990,
provides a facts and circumstances test in determining whether a particular transaction
constitutes an excluded forward contract. See id. The Brent Interpretation was reaffirmed
by the CFTC in the Swap Final Rule and accepted by the courts as a reasonable test in
distinguishing a future contract. See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based
Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”, Securities Act Release No. 9338,
Exchange Act Release No. 67,453, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,228 (Aug. 13, 2012);
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On the other hand, Section 1a(47) of the CEA broadly defines
“swaps” to include not only any transaction “commonly known as a
commodity swap,” but also any option of any kind that is for the purchase
or sale of one or more commodities.25 In informational materials released
on September 30, 2013, the CFTC stated that commodity options would
generally be regulated as swaps under Title VII of Dodd-Frank.26 Similar
to the definition of future contracts, which excludes forward contracts
from its scope, Congress excluded from the term swap “any sale of a
nonfinancial commodity . . . for deferred shipment or delivery, so long as
the transaction is intended to be physically settled.”27
Under the newly enacted Section 2(h)(7) of the CEA, Dodd-Frank
also promulgated an end-user exception from the mandatory clearing and

Regulation of Leverage Transactions and Other Off-Exchange Future Delivery Type
Instruments—Statutory Interpretation, 50 Fed. Reg. 11,656, 11,657 (Mar. 25, 1985)
(“Commission’s Office of the General Counsel is of the view that . . . . [i]n general, these
transactions share some of or all of the following indicia of futures contracts: they involve
the purchase or sale of a commodity for delivery in the future at a price or pricing formula
that is agreed upon when the transactions are initiated; they are standardized as to terms
and conditions other than price; unlike commercial forward contracts or traditional
installment agreements, they are undertaken primarily to assume or shift the risk of
commodity price changes and are not generally entered into for purposes of obtaining
delivery of the commodity, but rather are discharged through offsetting transactions or
other buy-back arrangements.”).
25. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A) (2012) (“[T]he term swap means any . . . transaction—
(i) that is a put, call, cap, floor, collar, or similar option of any kind that is for the purchase
or sale, or based on the value, of 1 or more interest or other rates, currencies,
commodities, securities, instruments of indebtedness, indices, quantitative measures, or
other financial or economic interests or property of any kind; . . . (iii) that provides on an
executory basis for the exchange . . . of 1 or more payments based on the value . . . of
1 or more interest or other rates, currencies, commodities, securities, instruments of
indebtedness, indices, quantitative measures, or other financial or economic interests or
property of any kind, or any interest therein or based on the value thereof, and that
transfers . . . in whole or in part, the financial risk associated with a future change in any
such value or level without also conveying a current or future direct or indirect ownership
interest in an asset (including any enterprise or investment pool) or liability that
incorporates the financial risk so transferred, including any agreement, contract, or
transaction commonly known as . . . (XVIII) an energy swap; . . . (XXII) a commodity
swap . . . .” (emphasis added)).
26. CFTC, CFTC DIVISION OF MARKET OVERSIGHT RESPONDS TO FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING COMMODITY OPTIONS (2013), https://forms.cftc.gov/_lay
outs/PublicForms/Docs/TradeOptionsFAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQT7-MAMZ].
27. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(B)(ii) (2012).
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exchange requirement.28 The exception applies when one counterparty to
the swap (i) is not a financial entity,29 (ii) uses the swap to hedge or
mitigate commercial risk associated with its underlying business,30 and
(iii) provides a notification to the CFTC on how it meets its financial
obligations associated with the relevant uncleared swaps.31
B. PROHIBITIONS ON MARKET MANIPULATION UNDER THE CEA
Section 753 of Dodd-Frank amended Section 6c of the CEA and
expanded the CFTC’s enforcement authority to prohibit manipulation and
fraud in connection with any swap or a contract of sale of any commodity
for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity.32
Prohibited practices generally fall under two groups: price manipulation
activities,33 and other practices that have a disruptive effect on the
functioning of the relevant commodity market.34

28.
29.

Id. § (2)(h)(7)(A).
Id. § 2(h)(7)(A)(i). CEA section 2(h)(7)(C)(i) provides that the term financial
entity will include (i) swap dealers and security-based swap dealers, (ii) major swap
participants and major security-based swap participants, (iii) commodity pools, (iv)
private funds as defined in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, (v) employee benefit
plans as defined in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and (iv)
persons predominantly engaged in banking or financial activities as defined in the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956. Id. § 2(h)(7)(C)(i).
30. 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)(ii) (2012). Examples can include businesses using swaps
to hedge their business related price risk exposures in industries such as manufacturing,
energy exploration, farming, transportation, or other commercial endeavors. See also
Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant,” and “Eligible Contract
Participant.” Exchange Act Release No. 66,868, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, at 6-75.
31. 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)(iii) (2012).
32. Id. §§ 6c, 9, 13b.
33. Id. § 6c(a)(2) (“A transaction referred to in paragraph (1) is a transaction that—
(A)(i) is, of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, a ‘wash sale’ or
‘accommodation trade’; or (ii) is a fictitious sale; or (B) is used to cause any price to be
reported, registered, or recorded that is not a true and bona fide price.”).
34. Id. § 6c(a)(5) (“Disruptive practices—It shall be unlawful for any person to
engage in any trading, practice, or conduct on or subject to the rules of a registered entity
that— (A) violates bids or offers; (B) demonstrates intentional or reckless disregard for
the orderly execution of transactions during the closing period; or (C) is, is of the
character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, “spoofing” (bidding or offering with
the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution.”).
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The reformed provisions of the CEA are striking in their width of
prohibited practices and potentially extend the range of trading activities
that may fall under regulatory scrutiny.35 In analyzing the price
manipulation claims under the CEA, the courts generally conduct a deep
inquiry into the mechanics of the trading activity.36 The new antimanipulation provisions include a strict liability prohibition regarding
conduct that “violat[es] bids and offers.”37 Furthermore, the newly
enacted statutory prohibition on “spoofing” (submitting market orders
without an intent to enter into an actual transaction) potentially brings a
wide range of daily market activity by professional traders under
scrutiny.38 The CEA’s specific approach in addressing conduct like
spoofing shows the importance Congress has placed on defining
prohibited trading practices in order to lower the pleading standards and
to ease plaintiffs’ onerous burden to establish price manipulation
elements such as the “ability to effect prices” and intent to “cause artificial
prices.”39 The CEA, as amended by Dodd-Frank, also prohibits situations
35. See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation Law: The New
CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 357 (2013).
36. See Ploss v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1055 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
(“For example, ‘[b]ecause every transaction signals that the buyer and seller have
legitimate economic motives for the transaction, if either party lacks that motivation, the
signal is inaccurate,’ . . . and using that false signal to manipulate commodity pricing can
qualify as manipulation.” (quoting In re Amaranth Nat’l Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F.
Supp. 2d 513, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))).
37. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(A) (2012).
38. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d
934 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that spoofing statute was not unconstitutionally vague as
applied); United States v. Coscia, 177 F. Supp. 3d 1087 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (first criminal
case that resulted in a conviction for “spoofing”); Meric Sar, Dodd-Frank and the
Spoofing Prohibition in Commodities Markets, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 383
(2017); Matthew Leising, Spoofing Went Mainstream in 2015, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-22/nabbing-the-rogue-algoinside-the-year-spoofing-went-mainstream [https://perma.cc/BH4E-633S]. Spoofingtype activity is argued to be one of the contributing factors to the Flash Crash of May 6,
2010. See Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: High Frequency Trading in an
Electronic Market, 72 J. FIN. 967 (2017).
39. See Bart Chilton, Comm’r, CFTC, Statement Regarding Anti-Fraud and AntiManipulation Final Rules: The Waiting (July 7, 2011), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
SpeechesTestimony/chiltonstatement070711 [https://perma.cc/T34H-PFT3] (discussing
the difficulty of proving spoofing cases under the pre-Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation
standard).
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of “attempted” manipulation and therefore does not require the CFTC to
show that the price resulting from the manipulative act was, in fact,
artificial.40 Under Section 22, the CEA also allows private individuals to
bring claims for damages arising from such manipulative conduct.41
C. CFTC’S EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY
All transactions tied to energy commodities will be deemed a
commodity future or option contract subject to CEA and CFTC
regulation, unless the transaction qualifies for an exception or an
exemption (administrative exclusion from the entirety or parts of CEA)
set forth in the CEA and regulations issued by the CFTC through its
rulemaking authority and interpretive guidance.42 So long as the relevant
transaction envisions the future delivery of a certain energy product (e.g.,
electric power, rights for capacity or transmission), provides to one of its
counterparties either an option with regards to the exact quantity of the
underlying energy commodity to be delivered, or an optional right to
execute a buy or sell order in the future, the transaction will be subject to
the CEA.43
The most important CEA exemptions of a general nature available
for energy market transactions are the “forward contract exclusion” and
the “end-user exception.”44 However, the CFTC has issued other
exemptions with consequences on energy markets in exercise of its more
special rulemaking authorities under Section 4 of the CEA. Under Section
4(c), the CFTC has plenary authority (which pre-dates Dodd-Frank) to
regulate commodity options differently than swaps.45 This different
regulation has reaffirmed the availability of “trade options” exemptions

40. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13(a)(2) (2012); Hohenberg Bros. Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 20271.
41. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2012).
42. See supra Section I.A.
43. CFTC also recently issued an interpretation that explicitly excludes certain
forward contracts with embedded volumetric optionality from its definition of options
and futures contracts and proposed an interpretive guidance that will recognize an
exception for certain natural and electric power contracts. See Forward Contracts with
Embedded Volumetric Optionality, Exchange Act Release No. 74,936, 80 Fed. Reg.
28,239 (May 18, 2015).
44. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1a(47)(B)(ii), 2(h)(7) (2012).
45. Id. § 6(c).
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for some non-financial companies as relief from certain reporting
requirements and from designations as a “swap dealer” for activity related
to physically settled commercial energy contracts.46 However, it should
be noted that most of these exemptions only provide relief from CEA
provisions regarding centralized clearing, registration, and reporting
requirements.47 Anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions continue to
apply to these exempted transactions as the CFTC regularly reserves the
applicability of relevant CEA provisions and its own enforcement powers
to exempted transactions.48
1. Dodd-Frank Provisions Guiding the Mutual Existence of the CFTC
and FERC
When it comes to electricity markets, the statutory language of the
CEA, as amended by Dodd-Frank, does not offer direct guidance on how
to resolve potential disputes that may arise due to double regulation by
FERC and the CFTC. First, Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the CEA provides that
the CFTC shall have “exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts,
agreements . . . and transactions involving” futures contracts “traded or
executed” on CFTC-licensed exchanges.49 Secondly, Dodd-Frank
incorporated a saving clause into the CEA that preserves FERC’s and
other state regulators’ authority over market activity “entered into
pursuant to a tariff or rate schedule approved by [FERC] or a State
regulatory authority”50 and that is “executed, traded, or cleared on a
registered entity or trading facility owned or operated by a regional
transmission organization [“RTO”] or independent system operator
[“ISO”].”51 However, this does not in any way restrict the CEA’s
applicability to such transactions.52 In order to provide a venue for
46.
47.

See Commodity Options, 77 Fed. Reg. 25,320 (Apr. 27, 2012).
See id. at 25,328 (“Finally, at § 32.3(d), the interim final rule also retains for
trade options the antifraud and anti-manipulation rules under part 180, § 23.410, the
specific options antifraud provisions of pre-Dodd-Frank § 32.9 (renumbered herein as §
32.4), and any other general antifraud, anti-manipulation, and enforcement provisions of
the CEA, including but not limited to, CEA sections 2, 4b, 4c, 4o, 4s(h)(1)(A),
4s(h)(4)(A), 6, 6c, 6d, 9, and 13.”).
48. See id.
49. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2012). See generally Ghee, supra note 12 (discussing
the limitations of FERC jurisdiction over manipulative conduct in financial markets).
50. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(I)(i) (2012).
51. Id. § 2(a)(I)(i)(II).
52. See Ghee, supra note 12, at 390.
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reconciling potential regulatory conflicts, Section 4(c)(6) authorizes the
CFTC, subject to certain conditions, to issue exemptions from the
“requirements”53 of the CEA for “certain transactions entered into
pursuant to a tariff or rate schedule approved or permitted to take effect
by FERC54 or a state regulatory authority.”55 However, the CEA limits the
CFTC’s authority to issue an exemption under Section 4(c)(6) by
requiring the exemption to be consistent with Sections 4(c)(1) and
4(c)(2).56 Sections 4(c)(1) and (2) require the exemption to be aimed at
“promot[ing] responsible economic or financial innovation and fair
competition.”57 The CFTC must also determine that (i) the exemption
would be “consistent with the public interest and the purposes of the
CEA;” (ii) the transaction would be entered into solely between
“appropriate persons” as defined in 7 U.S.C. § 6(c); and (iii) the
exemption would not have “a material adverse effect on the ability of the
CFTC or any contract market to discharge its regulatory or self-regulatory
responsibilities” under the CEA.58

53. In various agency actions CFTC declared that it is interpreting the statutory
language of “requirements” under CEA as meaning CEA provisions that stipulate
mandatory margin, reporting, and registration requirements, and not including the CEA
provisions that include prohibitions against manipulative conduct. Thus, according to the
CFTC’s own interpretation of its authority to grant exemptions to FERC regulated
markets, CFTC does not have power under CEA § 4(c)(6) (7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(6)) to grant
relief from compliance with prohibitions against manipulative conduct. See infra Section
II.A.1.
54. Under the FPA, FERC can approve a tariff that is “just and reasonable.” 16
U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012). In defining “just and reasonable,” courts have developed a costcausation principle that requires FERC tariff approvals to establish that the parties
bearing facility costs will receive benefits that are “roughly commensurate.” Ill.
Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476-78 (7th Cir. 2009).
55. See 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(6) (2012). In enacting section 4(c), Congress noted that the
purpose of the provision was to give the Commission a means of providing certainty and
stability to existing and emerging markets, so that financial innovation and market
development can proceed in an effective and competitive manner. H.R. Rep. No. 102978, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3179, 3213 (1992).
56. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(6) (2012).
57. Id. § 6(c)(1)-(2).
58. Id.
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2. CFTC’s Exemptive Orders For RTO/ISO Markets Under CEA Section
4(c)(6)
Under its Section 4(c)(6) authority, the CFTC has thus far issued two
exemptive orders. The first and more significant exemptive order was
issued in March 2013 in response to a petition by six RTOs and ISOs (“the
RTO-ISO Order”).59 The RTO-ISO Order granted the energy futures and
swaps markets administered by these organizations60 relief from various
mandatory margin, registration, and reporting requirements under the
CEA—except CEA’s anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions—and
preserved the CFTC’s authority to enforce these provisions through civil
enforcement actions.61 The scope of the RTO-ISO Order also included
transactions that fall within the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
59. Final Order in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System
Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. 19,880 (Apr. 2, 2013).
The petitioners constitute almost the entirety of U.S. electricity markets: three RTOs
(Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., ISO New England, Inc., and
PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.) and three ISOs (California Independent System Operator
Corporation, New York Independent System Operator, Inc., and Electric Reliability
Council of Texas, Inc. (“ERCOT”)). See id. The only large-scale RTO that was not a
party to the petition was Southwest Power Pool, which filed its own petition. See Notice
of Proposed Order and Request for Comment on an Application for an Exemptive Order
from Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (May 21, 2015).
60. For a background and discussion of policy issues, see Susan Kelly & Elise
Caplan, Time for a Day 1.5 Market: A Proposal to Reform Rto-Run Centralized
Wholesale Electricity Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 491 (2008) (“With the exception of the
SPP, [all of these RTOs] currently or will soon operate, centralized day-ahead and realtime spot markets for electric energy, as well as markets for certain ancillary services
needed to support open access transmission service.”).
61. The exemption under the RTO-ISO Order is granted in particular for certain
transactions that fall within the definitions of “Financial Transmission Rights,” “Energy
Transactions,” “Forward Capacity Transactions,” or “Reserve or Regulation
Transactions,” and that are offered or sold in a market administered by one of the
petitioning RTOs or ISOs pursuant to a tariff, rate schedule, or protocol that has been
approved or permitted to take effect by FERC or PUCT. Final Order in Response to a
Petition from Certain Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission
Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 19,912-14. To be eligible for the exemption the party to
the transaction must be: (1) “Appropriate persons,” as defined in section 4(c)(3)(A)
through (J) of the CEA; (2) “eligible contract participants,” as defined in section
1a(18)(A) of the CEA and in Commission regulation 1.3(m); or (3) “in the business of (i)
generating, transmitting, or distributing electric energy, or (ii) providing electric energy
services that are necessary to support the reliable operation of the transmission system.”
Id.
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(“ERCOT”), which is the only electric grid in the U.S. that operates
entirely within a single state.62 Remarkably, the RTO-ISO Order as
proposed and finalized, did not address Section 22 of the CEA63 or involve
any discussion regarding the private right of action throughout the notice
and comment rulemaking period.64
In May 2015, the second exemption under Section 4(c)(6) was
proposed by the CFTC in response to a petition by Southwest Power Pool
(“SPP”) (“SPP Proposed Order”).65 The RTO-ISO Order and SPP
Proposed Order are almost identical with respect to the scope of the
exemptions they provide to the transactions taking place in the respective
energy markets. However, the SPP Proposed Order includes an explicit
statement by the CFTC that the private right of action for market
participants shall continue to exist with regards to the exempted
transactions.66 In the commentaries section of the SPP Proposed Order,
the CFTC stated that the availability of a private right of action was a
62. The ERCOT only operates in Texas, which gets about 85% of its electricity from
the ERCOT grid. See Daniel M. Gonzales, Shockingly Certain: Why Is the Public Utility
Commission of Texas Steadfast in Its Resolve to Keep Texas’s Energy Market
Deregulated Amidst Turmoil?, 10 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 497, 502 (2009) (“In 1999,
with the passage of the revised Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA99), the Texas
legislature changed its tune in regard to the nature of the electricity market. In PURA99,
the Texas legislature declared that ‘[t]he legislature finds that the production and sale of
electricity is not a monopoly warranting regulation of rates, operations, and services and
that the public interest in competitive electric market requires that . . . electric services
and their prices should be determined by customer choices and the normal forces of
competition.’”); Paul B. Mohler, Has the “Complete and Permanent Bond of Protection”
Provided by FERC Refunds Eroded in the Transition to Market-Based Rates?, 33
ENERGY L.J. 41 (2012). See generally Christopher J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp,
Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275
(2014) (discussing FERC regulation generally).
63. See Final Order in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System
Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 19,912. CFTC
excepted its general anti-manipulation authority and other scienter-based prohibitions
under CEA sections 2(a)(1)(B), 4(d), 4b, 4c(b), 4o, 4s(h)(1)(A), 4s(h)(4)(A), 6(c), 6(d),
6(e), 6c, 6d, 8, 9, and 13 of the Act, and any implementing regulations from the
exemption. Id.
64. See Final Order in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System
Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 19,880.
65. Notice of Proposed Order and Request for Comment on an Application for an
Exemptive Order from Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 80 Fed. Reg. 29,490 (May 21, 2015).
66. Id. at 29,493.
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matter of public importance.67 Without the agency having explicitly
addressed the issue through notice and comment rulemaking, the
RTO/ISO Order as well as the SPP Proposed Order could not be
interpreted in a way that bars private anti-manipulation claims.68
3. Aspire v. GDF: Fifth Circuit Holds that Private Right of Action is
Unavailable Under the RTO-ISO Order
In February 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas dismissed a private anti-manipulation lawsuit on the grounds that
the CEA’s Section 22 private right of action was not available to the
plaintiffs under the RTO-ISO Order.69 The lawsuit was brought by two
trading companies alleging that the defendants, various electricity
generators in ERCOT’s market, violated CEA’s prohibitions on
manipulation70 by “intentionally withholding electricity generation during

67.
68.

Id.
Id. (“By enacting CEA section 22, Congress provided private rights of action as
a means for addressing violations of the [CEA] alternative to [CFTC] enforcement action.
It would be highly unusual for the [CFTC] to reserve to itself the power to pursue claims
for fraud and manipulation—a power that includes the option of seeking restitution for
persons who have sustained losses from such violations or a disgorgement of gains
received in connection with such violations 50—while at the same time denying private
rights of action and damages remedies for the same violations. Moreover, if the [CFTC]
intended to take such a differentiated approach (i.e., to limit the rights of private persons
to bring such claims while reserving to itself the right to bring the same claims), the RTOISO Order would have included a discussion or analysis of the reasons therefore. Thus,
the [CFTC] did not intend to create such a limitation, and believes that the RTO-ISO
Order does not prevent private claims for fraud or manipulation under the Act. For the
avoidance of doubt, the [CFTC] notes that this view equally applies to SPP’s Proposed
Exemption. Therefore, [the RTO-ISO Order] also would not preclude such private
claims.”).
69. Aspire Commodities, LP v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., No. H-14-1111,
2015 WL 500482, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Aspire Commodities,
L.P. v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., 640 F. App’x 358 (5th Cir. 2016), and reh’g
denied, No. 15-20125, 2016 WL 3211288 (5th Cir. 2016).
70. 7 U.S.C. § 9(1), (3).
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times of tight supply,”71 which artificially created unpredictable prices in
the secondary futures markets.72
In order to avoid a denial of their private right of action under the
RTO-ISO Order for transactions in the ERCOT market, the plaintiffs
initially built their commodity manipulation case on the alleged illegal
conduct’s secondary effects on the Intercontinental Exchange (“ICE”),
which was outside the scope of the RTO-ISO Order.73 However, in an
unpublished opinion, the court rejected the lawsuit by relying on the
explicit exemption from the CEA provisions that the RTO-ISO Order
granted to ERCOT transactions.74 In analyzing the plain meaning of the
RTO-ISO Order, the court interpreted its relevant carve-out provision—
which contained a list of CEA provisions that will continue to apply to
the exempted transactions—as an exhaustive list.75 Since Section 22—
which is the private right of action provision of CEA—was not explicitly
enumerated in the carve-out section of the RTO-ISO Order, the court

71. Aspire, 2015 WL 500482, at *1. (“ERCOT balances the real time supply with
the demand for electricity by adjusting the market price, called the Locational Marginal
Price (‘LMP’) to incentivize more or less energy production as needed. Generators like
Defendants offer electricity to ERCOT in price/quantity pairings of their choosing,
known as offer curves, which ERCOT uses to balance the system by using the next
lowest-cost energy to serve the next unit of demanded energy. Generators can change
their offer curves throughout the day but must supply an offer curve at least one hour in
advance. A generator can effectively prevent dispatch of its energy by offering it to
ERCOT at prices above the LMP, but if that generator’s energy is needed, ERCOT will
raise the LMP to attract and capture the needed energy. ERCOT’s primary regulator is
the Public Utility Commission of Texas (‘PUCT’).”).
72. Id. Plaintiffs alleged numerous instances in which defendant GDF engaged in
“economic withholding” by suddenly increasing its offer prices from their normal rates—
at times from the usual price range of $100-1000 per MWh to $5000 MWh (which is the
maximum allowable “Locational Marginal Price” under ERCOT rules). Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at *5. Under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius when
certain items are listed in a statutory provision but other related items are omitted, courts
infer “that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not
inadvertence.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003). Moreover, the
Supreme Court has explained that ordinarily, silence does not convey any meaning, much
less the potential for sweeping liability. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 749 (1989) (“Ordinarily, Congress’ silence is just that—silence.”).
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opined that the CFTC clearly intended the private right of action to be
suspended by the RTO-ISO Order.76
On appeal, the plaintiffs expanded their argument to also cover the
transactions in the ERCOT market.77 In support of this argument, the
plaintiffs relied on the CFTC’s May 2015 statement—found in the
recently proposed SPP Proposed Order and the relevant CFTC
commentary—reflecting the agency’s view that the private right of action
shall survive the RTO-ISO Final Order.78 The Fifth Circuit rejected this
argument based on waiver grounds and the SPP Proposed Order’s lack of
persuasiveness as an administrative act.79 According to the Fifth Circuit,
the RTO-ISO Order’s language was unequivocal and the SPP Proposed
Order could not be given weight as an agency act in direct conflict with a
final order.80

76. Aspire, 2015 WL 500482, at *5 (“However, as Defendants correctly argue,
GDF’s transactions within ERCOT are exempted transactions under the Final Order. As
observed above, the exempted transactions include “energy transactions,” which are
defined as transactions in a day-ahead or real time market for the purchase or sale of
electricity, such as the transactions in this case. The Final Order exempts these
transactions ‘from all provisions of the CEA,’ which includes 7 U.S.C. § 25 upon which
Plaintiffs rely as the basis for their private cause of action. Moreover, § 7 U.S.C. § 25–
which is Section 22 of the CEA-is not included in the Final Order’s listing of CEA
sections retained as part of the CFTC’s general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority
and scienter-based prohibitions.”).
77. Aspire Commodities, L.P. v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., 640 F. App’x 358,
362 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, No. 15-20125, 2016 WL 3211288 (5th Cir. 2016).
78. Id.
79. Id. (“We recognize that the Commission issued the SPP Proposed Order after the
district court decided this case, so Aspire could not have used the Order as support before
the district court. Nonetheless, Aspire could have made the interpretive argument it
makes now: that the Final Order should not be read to exempt ERCOT transactions from
the private right of action provision even though that provision is not an enumerated
exception. Even if we were to address the merits of Aspire’s interpretive argument, the
SPP Proposed Order does not change our analysis. We do not find the Final Order
ambiguous. Accordingly, we only consider the Commission’s interpretation of the Final
Order as expressed in the SPP Proposed Order’s preamble for its ‘persuasive power.’
[citation omitted]. We do not find the Commission’s statements in the preamble of the
SPP Proposed Order persuasive as they directly contradict the plain language of the Final
Order.”).
80. Id.
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4. CFTC Reviews Private Right of Action for RTO-ISO Markets and
Retreats After Opposition by the Industry
As a response to the Fifth Circuit ruling, in May 2016, the CFTC
proposed an amendment to the RTO-ISO Order (the “Proposed RTO-ISO
Amendment”) specifically addressing the issue of private right of action
in exempted energy markets.81 In the Proposed RTO-ISO Amendment,
which was issued by a 2-1 vote, the CFTC aimed to clarify the
interpretation of the RTO-ISO Order and re-establish the availability of a
private right of action under Section 22 of the CEA in relation to
exempted transactions.82 In favor of the availability of the private right of
action, the CFTC articulated five main arguments: (1) the preservation of
“the private right of action with respect to fraud and manipulation will not
cause regulatory uncertainty or duplicative or inconsistent regulation;” (2)
“conflicting judicial interpretations regarding the nature of the [RTO-ISO
transactions] would not affect the jurisdiction of FERC or any relevant
state regulatory authority;” (3) “the private right of action in the CEA is
instrumental in protecting the American public, deterring bad actors, and
maintaining the credibility of the markets subject to the Commission’s
jurisdiction;” (4) “the private right of action under CEA [S]ection 22 was
established by Congress as an integral part of the CEA’s enforcement and
remedial scheme;” and (5) “the Commission’s preservation of [S]ection
22 liability with respect to the [carve-out provisions] is consistent with
the Commission’s actions in prior 4(c) orders.”83 Commissioner
Giancarlo, who has opposed the proposed amendment, filed a dissenting
opinion in which he articulated the reasons of his opposition.84 According
81. Notice of Proposed Amendment to and Request for Comment on the Final Order
in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System Operators and Regional
Transmission Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,245 (May 16, 2016).
82. Timothy Massad, Chairman, CFTC, Statement in Support of the Proposed
Amendment
to
the
RTO-ISO
Order
(May
10,
2016),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Spe
echesTestimony/massadstatement051016 [https://perma.cc/P7RT-PPV3] (“Private
rights of action have been instrumental in helping to protect market participants and deter
bad actors. These actions can also augment the limited enforcement resources of the
CFTC, and serve the public interest by allowing harmed parties to seek damages in
instances where the Commission lacks the resources to do so on their behalf.”).
83. 81 Fed. Reg. at 30,248-49.
84. J. Christopher Giancarlo, Comm’r, CFTC, Statement on the Proposed
Amendment to the RTO-ISO Order (May 10, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Sp
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to Commissioner Giancarlo, the “plain language” of the RTO-ISO Order,
relying on which the market participants have been operating for over
three years, was unambiguous.85 Therefore, the dissenting Commissioner
argued that the private rights of action should not survive the exemption.86
Furthermore, the CFTC’s action created legal uncertainty by retroactively
applying a previously unarticulated position, without following
rulemaking procedures.87 The Commissioner also recognized that, given
the continuing availability of CFTC enforcement actions to seek
restitution on behalf of aggrieved individuals, allowing private rights of
action on top of them would unnecessarily cause electricity rate increases
as companies would have to save for potentially expensive litigation
matters.88
In the following months, the proposed amendment faced intense
criticism from various actors such as utilities companies, trade
organizations, RTOs, and FERC staff.89 Meanwhile, the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, in a letter voicing the concerns
raised by the commentators, also requested a briefing from the CFTC by
July 15, 2016.90 The primary concern of the critics was the regulatory
burdens and the uncertainty that may be caused by dual regulation of the
energy markets by both the CFTC and FERC.91 The critics generally
eechesTestimony/giancarlostatement051016 [https://perma.cc/BBX9-J5Q2] (“It can be
argued that private claims may serve the public interest by empowering injured parties to
seek compensation for damages where the Commission lacks the resources to do so on
their behalf. Yet, the extensive regulation and monitoring of RTOs and ISOs significantly
obviates the policing role of private suits in these markets. . . . I believe that with the
protection provided by such extensive regulatory oversight the Commission should not
permit private litigation. Doing so would result in too many cooks in the proverbial
oversight kitchen.”).
85. Id.
86. Id. In reaching this conclusion Commissioner Giancarlo relied on a canon of
statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Dennis J. Hough, Jr., FERC Opposes Private Right of Action in CFTC
Proceeding; Congress Requests Briefing, LEXOLOGY (July 6, 2016),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=057af511-f522-4a92-8975-c683836db0
54 [https://perma.cc/TQR9-49VW].
90. Letter from Fred Upton, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, to
Timothy G. Massad, Chairman, CFTC (June 24, 2016), https://energycommerce.house.
gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/114/letters/20160624
CFTC.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX4E-EWRJ].
91. Hough, Jr., supra note 89.
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argued that Congress granted FERC exclusive authority through the
Federal Power Act (“FPA”) to enforce anti-market manipulation
provisions with respect to the RTOs, and the FPA expressly prohibits
private rights of action.92 Allowing the private right of action in energy
markets would create uncertainty and costs that will negatively affect
prices to the detriment of the users.93
After considering numerous comments provided by the industry and
stakeholders, the CFTC in October 2016 issued and finalized the SPP
Proposed Order and the Proposed RTO-ISO Amendment in a joint final
order (the “Joint Final Order”).94 Remarkably, in the Joint Final Order the
CFTC retreated from its prior position and expanded the exemptions
granted to RTOs and ISOs under Section 4(c)(6) to bar private actions
that could be brought under Section 22.95 In doing so, the CFTC
recognized its continuing enforcement authority, the special nature of the
RTO-ISO markets, and their intensive regulation by FERC.96 More
interestingly, CFTC also recognized that the availability of a private right
92. Letter from Max Minzner, Gen. Counsel, FERC, to Christopher Kirkpatrick,
Sec’y, CFTC (June 14, 2016), https://www.findknowdo.com/sites/default/files/news/atta
chments/2016/06/ferccea-private-claims-rto-marketsopposition-6-14-16.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/7SMV-3A2X].
93. Id.
94. Final Order Regarding Southwest Power Pool, Inc. Application to Exempt
Specified Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,062 (Oct. 24, 2016).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 73,071 (“Considering all of these factors together, rather than any of these
factors alone . . . the Commission concludes that in the limited context of activities within
the RTO-ISO markets, there should be a complete exemption from private claims under
CEA section 22. Initially, the Commission agrees that the unique nature of the RTO-ISO
markets differentiates this issue from other contexts in which a private right of action is
essential. The RTO-ISO markets are heavily regulated by FERC and PUCT, with whom
the Commission shares jurisdiction. This regulation is ‘pervasive’ and it includes rate
monitoring, tariff approval, authorization of market rules and pricing mechanisms, and
real-time oversight of markets. As part of an articulated regulatory structure, these
markets are also subject to close surveillance not only by the regulators but also by
independent market monitors. In addition, FERC and PUCT support their regulation of
the electric power markets with an enforcement program that includes the authority to
order civil penalties, disgorgement, and to resettle the market. Furthermore, the
Commission will continue to police these markets for fraud, manipulation and other
unfair trading activities and, as contemplated by Congress, it can and will cooperate with
these fellow regulators to deter and prevent unlawful trading activities in the RTO-ISO
markets.”).
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of action might conflict with the Congressional intent regarding
electricity markets97: Congress considered the issue in 2005 in the context
of amendments to the FPA and decided not to allow the private right of
action in these markets.98
II. ANALYSIS
The CFTC’s withdrawal of the anti-manipulation private right of
action in RTO-ISO markets might be celebrated by the energy industry at
first sight. But the true legal and economic ramifications of this policy
choice—and the special status given to RTO-ISO markets among other
commodities markets—are likely to unfold in the longer term.
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION’S
AVAILABILITY
1. Plain Meaning of the CEA: Does CEA Give CFTC The Power to
Suspend Private Right of Action in the First Case?
The withdrawal of the private right of action in RTO-ISO markets is
remarkable, especially since it amounts to the removal of a statutory right
through agency action.99 Under Chevron, reasonable agency
interpretations are generally given deference by the courts in relation to
issues within their regulatory jurisdiction for which a statute does not
provide an unambiguous rule.100
97. Id. at 73,072 (“In 2005, Congress amended the FPA to give FERC the authority
to pursue manipulation of the electricity markets. At that time, Congress focused on
whether there should be a private right of action for manipulation of these specific
markets. Congress explicitly declined to grant such a right of action. This was a more
particularized determination regarding the merits of private enforcement in these unique
markets than the legislative judgment reflected in CEA section 22 that there should be a
generally applicable private right of action for fraud and manipulation in the
Commission’s jurisdictional markets.”).
98. Id.
99. See David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative Preemption, 38 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267 (2015) (“Administrative preemption is a convenience and
contrivance for modern government. But, as hypothesized here, it is also a constitutional
paradox. Administrative preemption requires that agency action simultaneously qualify
as (1) ‘Law’ for federalism purposes and (2) ‘not Law’ for separation of powers.”).
100. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see
also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding unanimously that an agency’s
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Section 4(c)(6) of the CEA provides that the Commission shall issue
exemptions from the “requirements” of the CEA for the transactions
entered into pursuant to a tariff or rate schedule approved or permitted to
take effect by energy regulators.101 Thus, one needs to make a closer
textual inquiry on what the term “requirement” actually may entail within
the context of the CEA to answer two questions: (i) whether the CEA
provides unambiguous guidance with regards to the scope of the CFTC’s
exemptive powers, and (ii) in the corollary, whether the CFTC has acted
in conflict with its authority under Section 4(c)(6).
In the Proposed RTO-ISO Amendment, CFTC provided an overview
of its exemptive powers under Section 4(c)(6), and stated that within the
context of the CEA the term “requirement” usually refers to various
regulatory registration and reporting rules applicable to commodity
options and swap trading parties and exchanges.102 In the CFTC’s opinion
it was dubious at best to assume a Section 22 private right of action to
qualify as such a “requirement.”103 In bold words, the CFTC itself
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation was entitled to particularly deferential
respect); J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, The Tailoring Deference to Variety with a Wink and a
Nod to Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of
Agency Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18 (2010) (“The Court generally applied
Chevron deference if a rule had been adopted in notice-and-comment proceedings, and
otherwise defaulted to classic Skidmore analysis of various persuasive factors to
determine whether a less formal agency interpretation warranted deference. In its final
term, the Rehnquist Court resolved a complex issue concerning the stare decisis effect
on agencies of judicial precedents interpreting black-letter law. In National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, the Court held that an agency is
bound by a court’s prior interpretation of a statute or rule only if the court declared its
language unambiguous. In that event, the prior judicial interpretation controls over any
subsequent agency interpretation to the contrary.”).
101. 7 U.S.C. § 6(c)(6) (2012). Section 4(c)(1) contains a broader language that
authorizes the CFTC to grant exemptions from the CEA’s “requirements” as well as
“from any other provision of this Act.” Id. § 6(c)(1).
102. Notice of Proposed Amendment to and Request for Comment on the Final Order
in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System Operators and Regional
Transmission Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,245, 30,249 (May 16, 2016).
103. Id. (“Based on the difference in language between section 4(c)(6), under which
the RTO-ISO Order was issued, and section 4(c)(1), the Commission notes that it is not
clear that section 4(c)(6) provides the Commission with the authority to exempt the
Covered Entities from the private right of action found in section 22. Section 4(c)(1)
authorizes the Commission to grant exemptions from the Act’s ‘requirements’ or ‘from
any other provision of this Act,’ with certain exceptions. Section 4(c)(6), by contrast,

2017]

A REGULATORY RETREAT

629

declared its hesitation to conclude that the power to provide an exemption
from Section 22 is “within the scope of the power granted to the
Commission by section 4(c)(6).”104 The ordinary meaning of the word
“requirement” indicates a necessity (“something that is needed or that
must be done”) rather than a prohibition (e.g., the rules against
manipulative practices) or in the alternative, a pre-condition to some other
result (“something that is necessary for something else to happen or be
done”).105 Thus, there is an argument to be made that the withdrawal of
the private right of action for exemptions granted under Section 4(c)(6)
may in fact be in violation of the plain meaning of the CEA’s text.
When interpreting the Supreme Court’s case law regarding Chevron
deference, some commentators argue that the threshold for deference to
administrative acts may indeed be lowered if the relevant agency act
causes major changes in a statutory program.106 The CFTC resorted to
notice and comment rulemaking and public comments when issuing the
relevant Final Joint Order. However, as argued by Sunstein, the
background principles of administrative law and various non-delegation
doctrines may require the level of deference to agency action to be
lowered if the relevant agency action creates a large scale change in the
empowers the Commission to exempt agreements, contracts, or transactions from
‘requirements’ of the Act only. It is not clear that the section 22 private right of action
itself is a ‘requirement’ and, therefore, it is not clear that the power to provide an
exemption from section 22 is within the scope of the power granted to the Commission
by section 4(c)(6).”).
104. Id.
105. Requirement, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictiona
ry/requirement [https://perma.cc/3FCP-U2YR].
106. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 244–45 (2006)
(“Agencies would not receive deference when they attempt to exercise their authority in
ways that produce large-scale changes in the structure of the statutory programs that they
are administering. . . . In some cases, well-established background principles operate to
‘trump’ Chevron. Agencies are not permitted to interpret ambiguous statutes so as to
apply beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. Nor are agencies allowed to
interpret ambiguous statutes to apply retroactively. An agency cannot construe an
ambiguous statute so as to raise serious constitutional doubts. In these and other contexts,
courts have insisted on a series of nondelegation canons, which require legislative, rather
than merely executive, deliberation on the issue in question. Congress will not lightly be
taken to have delegated to agencies the choice of how to resolve certain sensitive
questions. Perhaps MCI and Brown & Williamson can be understood to build on these
nondelegation canons to suggest a more general principle: Fundamental alterations in
statutory programs, in the form of contractions or expansions, will not be taken to be
within agency authority.”).
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statutory program administered by the agency.107 In the present case, the
CFTC’s withdrawal of the private right of action arguably constitutes an
extreme situation cautioned by Sunstein: a generally available statutory
right being removed through an agency order issued in response to a
petition by various private entities and which does not strictly meet the
definition of a general rulemaking.108 In this sense, analogies to similar
SEC rulemaking may not hold much value either. The commodities law
differs from the securities law in its approach to the private right of action.
Section 22 of the CEA provides an explicit statutory authority for a
private right of action contrary to the private right of action in securities
laws,109 which was to a great extent developed by the courts.110
2. Double Regulation Concerns
Most of the arguments raised against the availability of a private right
of action in RTO-ISO markets were centered on concerns arising from the
prospect of double regulation by the CFTC and FERC, and the potential
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
For a critique of the doctrine of implied private rights of action—namely, reading
congressional intent into a statute to enable a private right of action when there is no
explicit congressional disposition that establishes a private right of action—see Jonathan
A. Marcantel, Abolishing Implied Private Rights of Action Pursuant to Federal Statutes,
39 J. LEGIS. 251 (2013).
110. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
Although § 10(b) does not create an express private cause of action, courts recognize an
implied private cause of action to enforce the provision and its implementing regulation.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b); see Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014). For a review of private right of action in securities context, see Stanislav
Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World: Trading Obligations and
Privileges of Market Makers and a Private Right of Action, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 303 (2013). For a critique of judicially created private rights of action in areas
entrusted to agency enforcement, see Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1206–07 (1982) (“Judicial
creation of private rights of action raises greater difficulties when the legislature has
entrusted enforcement of a statutory scheme to a specialized administrative agency that
is empowered to issue rules or to adjudicate controversies under the statute. In this
context, private rights of action may usurp the agency’s responsibility for regulatory
implementation, decrease legislative control over the nature and amount of enforcement
activity, and force courts to determine in the first instance the meaning of a regulatory
statute.”).
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of discrepancies between the rules of the two agencies.111 These critics
should be dealt with in two perspectives. First, double-regulation
concerns imply that if a private right of action is available, it will impose
on the market participants additional regulatory burdens that will conflict
with the CFTC’s exemption regime (intra-jurisdictional conflict within
commodities laws). Secondly, the opposition raising double-regulation
concerns argues that the availability of a private right of action will
interfere with FERC’s jurisdiction over the relevant energy markets
(inter-jurisdictional conflict; conflict between energy and commodities
regulations). However, neither side of the double-regulation argument can
withstand a closer inquiry on whether the availability of a private right of
action would actually increase the market participants’ compliance
burdens.
First—in relation to the intra-jurisdictional conflict argument—
CEA’s anti-manipulation provisions and the relevant norms continue to
apply to exempted transactions through CFTC enforcement regardless of
the availability of a private right of action.112 Thus, private enforcement
will not create or change any compliance norms under the CEA for market
participants and will not affect the relief already granted to exempted
transactions from various other CEA provisions. Thus, the compliance
cost-related arguments against the private right of action do not really
have a tangible basis. On the other hand, the argument that the private
right of action will unduly burden the market participants could be
justified based on an assumption that the centralized CFTC enforcement
will act as a gatekeeper for a substantial number of frivolous actions that
will create undue costs for market participants. Yet, from a costs and
benefits perspective, the withdrawal of private enforcement may create
actual social wealth, only if the saved legal costs that would be incurred
for defending against frivolous claims indeed outweighed the social
benefits of bona fide anti-manipulation actions brought by private market
participants. As expressed by the CFTC, the private right of action in the
CEA is “instrumental in protecting the American public, deterring bad
actors, and maintaining the credibility of the markets subject to the

111.
112.

Hough, Jr., supra note 89.
See Final Order Regarding Southwest Power Pool, Inc. Application to Exempt
Specified Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 73,062 (Oct. 24, 2016).
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Commission’s jurisdiction.”113 The private right of action under Section
22 was “established by Congress as an integral part of the CEA’s
enforcement and remedial scheme.”114 Thus, it can be argued that these
arguments are directly in conflict with the Congressional intent embodied
in Dodd-Frank in relation to the contemplated reform agenda pertaining
to the energy markets. This Note further addresses this issue when
discussing regulatory efficiency and the benefits of supplemental private
enforcement.115
Second, the availability of a private right of action will not create an
inter-jurisdictional conflict between the CFTC and FERC. CFTC and
FERC regulations can—and in fact do—co-exist under the CEA as
amended by Dodd-Frank and the Federal Energy Act as affirmed by the
courts.116 As explained above, the CEA’s anti-manipulation provisions
continue to apply to the exempted transactions.117 In fact, FERC’s antimanipulation authority was originally intended to have a broader scope
than the CEA. After a rise in energy prices between 2002 and 2005,
Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005, expanding FERC’s
powers to prosecute energy price manipulation.118 The authority granted
to FERC by this legislation incorporated the language of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,119 rather than the language used in
the CEA. However, as a result of the Dodd-Frank amendments, the antimanipulation prohibition under the CEA covers a broader range of trading
activities—especially those that are defined by CEA as per se violations
(e.g., spoofing)—than the FERC’s current anti-manipulation authority.120
FERC’s statutory authority is limited in comparison to the CEA in relation
113. Notice of Proposed Amendment to and Request for Comment on the Final Order
in Response to a Petition from Certain Independent System Operators and Regional
Transmission Organizations, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,245, 30,248–49 (May 16, 2016).
114. Id.
115. See infra Section II.A.3.
116. Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2013). (“But [FEA Section 4A’s]
text fails to answer the question whether FERC may intrude upon the CFTC’s exclusive
jurisdiction. More importantly, because FERC is free to prohibit manipulative trading in
markets outside the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction, there is no ‘irreconcilable conflict’
between the two statutes and therefore no repeal by implication.”).
117. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
118. 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2012).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
120. See Hunter, 711 F.3d at 160; Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to
Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1849 n.249 (2016).
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to the types of unlawful conduct that constitutes price manipulation—as
an example, spoofing is illegal only under CEA.121 In today’s
interconnected markets, many parties enter into a wide range of financial
contracts tied to various energy market-related prices and indexes. This
increases the need for harmonious implementation of the applicable
regulatory standards ensured by the actions of all interested parties, public
and private. A sweeping withdrawal of private rights of action may create
regulatory gray zones, where certain unlawful conduct may escape the
oversight of both FERC and CFTC as demonstrated in the Aspire case—
where the plaintiff’s initial claim was based on an injury that occurred in
a connected secondary derivatives market. As seen in Aspire, FERC’s
jurisdiction does not reach derivatives markets and parties who transact
in derivative markets without ever becoming a direct party to the relevant
RTO or ISO transaction.122 Thus, manipulative conduct occurring in a
RTO/ISO market may have the potential to affect prices of contracts that
are outside the RTO/ISO market, and vice versa.
To further demonstrate how FERC’s regulatory web may be
potentially short over substantial secondary market activity, under the
FERC-approved rules of ERCOT, “[a] single generation entity that
controls less than 5% of the installed generation capacity in ERCOT . . .
is deemed not to have ERCOT-wide market power.”123 The defendant in
Aspire controlled about five percent of Texas’ market share.124 By
entering into a Settlement Agreement and Voluntary Mitigation Plan with
the [Texas market authority], the defendant obtained “an absolute defense
against an allegation pursuant to [Texas law and the market authority’s
121. See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (prohibiting any “offer to enter into, enter
into, or confirm the execution of a transaction” that “is used to cause any price to be
reported, registered, or recorded that is not a true and bona fide price”); id. § 6c(a)(5)
(prohibiting trading that (i) “violates bids or offers;” (ii) “demonstrates intentional or
reckless disregard for the orderly execution of transactions during the closing period;” or
(iii) “is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, ‘spoofing’ (bidding
or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution)”); id. § 13(a)(2)
(prohibiting actions “caus[ing] [the delivery/transmission of] false or misleading or
knowingly inaccurate reports concerning crop or market information or conditions that
affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce”).
122. Aspire Commodities, LP v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., No. H-14-1111,
2015 WL 500482, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Aspire Commodities,
L.P. v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., 640 F. App’x 358 (5th Cir. 2016), and reh’g
denied, No. 15-20125, 2016 WL 3211288 (5th Cir. 2016).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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regulations] of an abuse of market power through economic
withholding.”125 This requirement of substantial market power as a
condition to have an actual ability to manipulate market price more
closely follows the outdated price manipulation concept of antitrust laws,
and trails behind the emerging norms of market regulation in securities
and commodities laws. As demonstrated by events such as the flash crash,
in today’s markets where sophisticated trading tools are more and more
available to the general public, even a single trader with modest resources
may have a disproportionate capacity to disrupt the price integrity of a
market.126
Furthermore, as will be explained below, price distortion in
electricity markets creates impediments for the strategic planning of
smaller market entrants, which generally consist of renewable and
alternative energy companies. Thus, the necessity to create the correct
incentives during the transition of the U.S. energy infrastructure into a
smart grid makes high enforcement standards regarding antimanipulation authority an absolute priority to mitigate the associated
losses. In any case, withdrawal of the private right of action cannot
remedy the dichotomy inherent to the existing dual regulatory structure.
3. Regulatory Efficiency
The issue of regulation by private enforcement is usually dealt with
by answering one question: will the co-existence of private and public
enforcement cause inconsistent sets of policies for implementing a statute
that should apply uniformly nationwide?127 In the relevant literature and
case law, it is generally accepted that courts should not create private
causes of action for violations of “agency-administered statutes because
adjudication of such cases inevitably requires judges to make policy
decisions that should be made by agencies.”128 However, where the statute
explicitly provides for a private right of action, it is legally questionable

125.
126.

Id.
See Michael Lewis, Crash Boys, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.bloo
mberg.com/view/articles/2015-04-24/michael-lewis-has-questions-about-flash-crash
[https://perma.cc/HD5P-DQ77].
127. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1270 (1989).
128. Id. at 1243.
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whether such right can be suspended by an agency action.129 In the present
case, it is widely argued that FERC’s regulation should have a primary
role over the relevant markets to ensure a coherent policy agenda.
However, this argument ignores both the shortcomings of FERC’s
authority and Congress’ clear intent in placing the energy markets under
dual regulation, both by FERC and the CFTC.130
From a market governance policy perspective, the CFTC’s
withdrawal of private action in exempted markets represents a deliberate
choice in favor of “exclusive public enforcement” and a rejection of the
potential benefits of a more balanced “supplemental private right of
action” approach.131 From a regulatory policy perspective, the most
important benefits of the supplemental private right of action approach
are (i) greater compliance with the norms due to greater deterrence caused
by the potential of private lawsuits, and (ii) lower costs for the agency due
to the allocation of litigation costs between private claimants and the
regulatory agency.132 Thus, the unavailability of private right of action
129. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (“When Congress intends
private litigants to have a cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better
course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rights. But the Court has long
recognized that under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is
not inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available to the persons
benefited by its legislation.”).
130. Renee Labuz, Shareholders’ Rights to a Cause of Action Under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 Following Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
1521, 1542 (2006) (“Had Congress not intended there to be a private right of action, it
certainly would have amended the statute to so state or would have argued such during
one of the Act’s many floor discussions.”).
131. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 110, at 1215.
132. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 110, at 1214-15 (“Public regulation may be
needed because of the inadequacies of the common law system in coping with industrial
conditions. Public enforcement is, however, frequently inadequate because of budget
constraints; private actions can be a useful supplementary remedy by providing additional
enforcement resources. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak reflects these considerations. The Supreme
Court created a private right of action under section 27 of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 on behalf of shareholders challenging management’s proxy statements as
deceptive, notwithstanding the power of the SEC to bring suit and the failure of Congress
explicitly to authorize private enforcement. The Court emphasized the Act’s ‘broad
remedial purposes’ as well as the apparent inability of the SEC to effectuate those
purposes adequately. The Court did not discuss the possibility that private enforcement
might subvert political control over enforcement. Instead, the Court asserted that the
statutory goal of ‘protection of investors’ . . . implies the availability of judicial relief
where necessary to achieve that result. Private rights of action, unlike rights of initiation,
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may undermine optimal compliance with the anti-manipulation
provisions of the CEA.133 On the other hand, although the exclusive public
enforcement approach lacks these benefits, it is often desirable from the
perspective of a regulatory authority due to the greater deference it
provides to the agency in shaping the relevant case law with virtually
absolute authority in (i) deciding which lawsuits are to be litigated before
the courts, and (ii) shaping the development of the relevant legal doctrines
through direct control over the litigation strategy.134 Furthermore, the
exclusive public enforcement approach can be desirable for the CFTC to
maximize the agency’s role as a central repository for all information
regarding potential violations of the CEA through the agency’s new
whistleblower program.
Yet, from a normative perspective, it is yet to be seen whether the
refusal of the private right of action will help in achieving the greater
integrity in energy markets envisaged by Dodd-Frank. Furthermore, the
inevitable transformation from legacy energy networks into the smart grid
necessitates the leveling of the playing field, which requires
harmonization in regulatory norms and a homogenous enforcement
environment.135 In the long term, asymmetries in regulatory norms and
compliance behavior may undermine the transformation of the U.S.
economy towards greater efficiency and sustainability.136
do not divert limited agency resources from other violations that may be more important.”
(citations omitted)).
133. Brianne J. Gorod, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency
Power to Define Private Rights of Action, 113 YALE L.J. 939, 944–45 (2004) (“[T]he
ability of agencies to expand upon statutorily created private rights of action can also be
important in those instances when Congress explicitly creates a private right of action.”).
134. Id. at 1218 (quoting a court endorsing this approach in the context of FTC
regulations in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp, 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
135. For FERC’s indifference towards environmental considerations, see Christopher
J. Bateman & James T. B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power
Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 275 (2014) (“America’s electricity industry is at
the heart of some of the nation’s and world’s biggest environmental challenges, including
climate change. Yet the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . which has regulatory
jurisdiction over wholesale sales and transmission of electricity in interstate commerce
and is charged with ensuring that rates and other aspects of the industry are ‘just and
reasonable,’ has an official policy of excluding environmental considerations from its
regulation of the industry.”).
136. Gabe Maser, It’s Electric, but FERC’s Cost-Causation Boogie-Woogie Fails to
Justify Socialized Costs for Renewable Transmission, 100 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1830 (2012)
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Developments like rapid technological changes, sophistication of
daily trading firms that rely on speculative strategies, and the ongoing decentralization of the energy transmission networks require regulators to
provide adequate protections to new incomers and smaller cap
enterprises.137 Due to public enforcement’s limited resources, private
enforcement can play an important supplementary role to eliminate anticompetitive and predatory trading practices, which undermine the price
discovery function of energy markets and increase the risks borne by
smaller enterprises.138
4. Effects on Secondary Markets Doctrine: Anti-manipulation Private
Right of Action’s Reach on Secondary Markets and the Case Law on
Foreign Exchange Exemption
The Fifth Circuit’s approach in Aspire, which precipitated the
CFTC’s retreat, was possibly in conflict with the existing commodities
case law that dealt with jurisdictional questions regarding secondary
(“When a new plant is necessary, the market decides what type of plant is built. The
advent of renewable energy has brought a twist to this status quo. Renewable energy is
not cost competitive with fossil-fuel power without state or federal subsidies. Consumers
in states that have chosen to promote renewable energy may end up supporting
renewable-energy development through their state tax dollars—and, perhaps
unexpectedly, through their electric bills as well. This distribution of cost results because
the cost of the transmission needed to connect to a renewable-power facility can be shared
among ratepayers who ‘benefit’ from that power. These costs are not insubstantial.
Electricity lines cost millions of dollars per mile. With this amount of money at stake,
consumers deserve transparent and balanced mechanisms to ensure they truly benefit
from what they are paying for.”).
137. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 62–63 (2014) (“Yet to promote competition, FERC forced the unbundling of
electric power generation and transmission in interstate markets only, stopping short of
exerting similar authority over retail markets traditionally governed by the states. To
create incentives for additional transmission capacity, FERC has bootstrapped its
authority over rates in numerous creative ways yet has eschewed more aggressive
mandates over market design. Under the auspices of its rate-setting authority, FERC
midwifed the birth of new regional institutions capable of managing the increasingly
complex electricity grid, but never required the states to join them. Finally, FERC has
sought to force wholesale markets to be more welcoming to renewable resources and
demand response, taking risks that it believes will survive judicial scrutiny. All of these
efforts have involved interpretations of eighty-year-old statutory language written by a
Congress that could not have imagined most of the problems FERC now faces.”).
138. See generally Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition,
Diagnosis, and Deterrence, 31 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2010).
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markets. Ultimately, the CFTC, by withdrawing the private right of action
in exempted markets, sided with the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Aspire.
Yet, in Aspire the court’s dismissal of the claim was partially grounded
upon the argument that the plaintiff’s injury did not have a sufficient level
of proximity to the alleged manipulative trading patterns because,
although the suspect transactions took place in the exempted ERCOT
market, the defendant was not transacting in ERCOT directly and the
injuries he suffered in transacting in the ICE market were secondary in
nature.139 Since the resulting price change on ICE was an indirect
consequence of the defendant’s activities, and the defendant did not
directly enter into any transactions on the ICE market, secondary market
trading alone was insufficient to support an independent claim.140
Interestingly, in In re Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates Antitrust
Litigation, a joint antitrust and CEA manipulation case was filed before
the Southern District of New York in relation to a manipulative act in the
exempted forex OTC market based on the effects of these acts on the
related secondary markets.141 The defendants relied on Aspire to defend
against the private action.142 However, the court rejected the defendants’
motion to dismiss based on prior precedents that allowed claims brought
for misconduct occurring in physical natural gas and petroleum markets
affecting the exempted derivatives markets.143 The court found that the
plaintiff sufficiently alleged a direct relationship between currency prices
in the spot market and the value of each FX futures contract. Since
“futures prices [and options prices] [were] based on and derived
arithmetically from spot prices,” the claim was sufficient in showing the
defendants’ ability to influence FX futures and options prices for a CEA

139. Aspire Commodities, L.P. v. GDF Suez Energy N. Am., Inc., 640 F. App’x 358,
362 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, No. 15-20125, 2016 WL 3211288 (5th Cir. 2016).
140. Id.
141. In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., No. 13 Civ. 7789 (LGS),
2016 WL 5108131, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016). Foreign currency transactions are
excluded from CEA under the explicit authority of 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(1)(A).
142. Id.
143. Id. (first quoting Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465, 473 (1997) (“Congress’ broad
purpose in enacting the Treasury Amendment was to provide a general exemption from
CFTC regulation for sophisticated off-exchange foreign currency trading . . .”); then
citing CFTC v. Paragon FX Enters., LLC, Nos. 11 Civ. 7740(FM), 11 Civ. 7741(FM),
2015 WL 2250390, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2015) (summarizing legislative history)).
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anti-manipulation case.144 The court strongly distinguished Aspire as
unbinding authority, stating that it did not “read in the Aspire opinion an
intent to create a blanket rule that manipulation claims cannot lie where
the manipulative acts took place entirely in exempt markets.”145 The court
reasoned that “such a rule would be overbroad, and would ‘frustrate[] the
CEA’s primary purpose of preventing and deterring price
manipulations.’”146
The aforementioned cases demonstrate the regulatory difficulties
faced by lawmakers and agencies in drawing rules, especially in
consideration of today’s interconnected financial markets. In today’s
economy, where algorithmic trading, passive ETFs based on various
commodity indexes, and various forms of other derivative transactions
have become conventional investment tools, a more holistic and
integrated approach to anti-manipulation enforcement policy holds the
key to preventing market asymmetries and unfair regulatory arbitrage
opportunities.147
5. Floodgates Argument to Prevent Strike Actions
The most popular argument against the availability of private antimanipulation actions in energy markets is based on a belief that allowing
private actions will create an unfair burden on market participants who
will then incur the legal costs necessary to defend against frivolous cases.
This argument seems to closely follow the similar concerns that have been
raised in the securities law domain in response to the excess of speculative
lawsuits. This led to the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) by Congress, which elevated the
pleading standards for a prima facie case of securities manipulation.148
However, a closer analysis of the issue reveals that the mechanics of anti144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at *21.
Id.
Id. at *19 (quoting Parnon Energy, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 243).
See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage,
22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1996); Erich Schanze, Hare and Hedgehog Revisited: The
Regulation of Markets That Have Escaped Regulated Markets, 151 J. OF INST. AND
THEORETICAL ECON. 162, 162 (1995); Andrei Shleifer, A Theory of Yardstick
Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 319, 319-20 (1985).
148. See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its
Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489,
1489 (2006).
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manipulation cases differ significantly in the commodities law domain
from historical, economic, and legal perspectives.
Issues of the excessive private actions in securities usually arise in
the context of derivative lawsuits. The PSLRA aims to curb frivolous
lawsuits which do not necessarily represent a certain shareholder’s
financial interests. Similar to the shareholder disputes context, these
lawsuits generally stem from the perverse incentives that certain members
of the plaintiffs’ bar may have in pursuing legal fees by filing cases
against a corporation whose shares are owned by the lawyer’s client.149
Thus, the wide availability of private rights of action in shareholder and
securities litigation poses the risk of destroying value by creating an
artificial divergence between the best interests of a corporation and its
shareholders. Researchers found that the lower thresholds for private
securities actions and the potential liability risk affected the valuations of
many companies negatively, especially in high-risk industries and growth
companies.150 Thus, in the securities context, private actions may pose
significant conflicts of interest (among the legal profession, corporations,
and both large and small shareholders), as the filing of lawsuits often has
a direct effect on the stock price of the defendant company. Furthermore,
the relative ease of meeting pleading standards, such as the standard to
overcome a motion to dismiss, necessitates heightened norms. However,
in practice, it is questionable whether the adoption of the PSLRA
achieved the desired results. There is at least some evidence that
demonstrates an increase in the number of lawsuits brought in the postPSLRA era together with an increase in the average amount of damages
sought and lengthened settlement periods.151
149. The problem of value destruction by shareholder disputes is even more acute in
the M&A context. See Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and
a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 560 (2015).
150. See Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, In re Silicon
Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773,
777 (2000).
151. Choi & Thompson, supra note 148, at 1497; Michael A. Perino, Did the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 913 (2003) (“The
picture that emerges from studying these data is that the PSLRA did not work as intended.
The article demonstrates that as many, if not more, class actions are filed after the Act as
before. High technology issuers remain at significantly greater risk than issuers in other
industries. There is statistically significant evidence, however, that suggests that the Act
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On the other hand, in the commodities context, excessive private
litigation does not pose the same risks as in the securities context. For
example, contrary to that in the securities domain, a private antimanipulation action in commodities is brought not against the issuer of a
certain security, but against a trader who acts in breach of the CEA’s antimanipulation norms when trading a covered commodity. Thus, it is
unlikely for prices in the commodity markets to be affected by the filing
of a private lawsuit against a certain trader of the relevant commodity, as
the price of the underlying commodity is generally independent from the
commodities trader’s liability risk. Although, in the context of the energy
markets, liability risks faced by energy producers may cause an increase
in energy prices, a private right of action does not alter the relevant
compliance norms which must be adopted by the relevant market
participants regardless of the availability of private rights of action. The
CEA anti-manipulation provisions continue to apply to energy producers
through CFTC enforcement.
Contrary to the pleading standards in the securities context prior to
the PSLRA, proving price manipulation in the commodities context was
already quite difficult in the commodities context prior to Dodd-Frank.152
In fact, the adoption of independent statutory causes of action for
manipulative activity, such as “violation of bids” and “spoofing” reflects
a conscious effort by Congress to lower the relevant pleading standards
to improve market discipline in the commodities markets.153

improved overall case quality at least in the circuit that most strictly interprets one of the
Act’s key provisions, a heightened pleading requirement. The data also demonstrate that
Congress did not achieve its goal of increasing the filing delay in class actions. Actions
are filed as quickly now as they were before the Act’s passage. Nonetheless, that too may
provide indirect evidence that plaintiffs’ attorneys are selecting more apparent cases of
fraud that require less prefiling investigation.”).
152. Chilton, supra note 39.
153. See Sar, supra note 38. Spoofing-type activity is argued to be one of the
contributing factors to the flash crash of May 6, 2010. See Kirilenko et al., supra note 38;
Lewis, supra note 126 (“On the day of the flash crash, Sarao never actually sold stocks.
He was trying to trick the market into falling so that he could buy in more cheaply. But
whom did he fool with his trick? Whose algorithms were so easily gamed that they
responded to phony sell orders by creating a crash? Stupidity isn’t a crime. Still, it would
be interesting to know who, at this particular poker table, on this particular day, was the
fool.”).
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B. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW REGIME
1. CFTC As a Central Hub for Anti-Manipulation Actions
Exemption from the private right of action will cause the CFTC to
take center stage in the enforcement of the CEA’s anti-manipulation
provisions with respect to energy markets. This will enable the agency to
exert greater control over the development of anti-manipulation case law
with respect to the energy markets. Anti-manipulation cases in the
commodities context often require extensive economic analysis of market
data, which is not always fully available to private plaintiffs. Thus, it is
important for the CFTC to have greater influence in developing case law
and interpreting the various new norms introduced by Dodd-Frank.
Furthermore, the CFTC as a standalone gateway for enforcement
actions will significantly reduce the informational asymmetry that usually
undermines the viability of private actions in complex cases. Usually,
private plaintiffs have limited means to analyze and access market data,
undermining the private litigants’ chances of accessing and providing
sufficient evidence to prove manipulative conduct.154 Furthermore, many
markets have obligatory arbitration provisions for disputes arising among
their members. These restrictions greatly limit the ability of private
litigants to enforce market manipulation cases.155 Thus, the new regime

154. This is especially true when considering the prominence of hyper frequency
trading in today’s markets. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Oystacher,
No. 15-CV-9196, 2016 WL 3693429, at *15 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2016) (“Algorithmic
traders include a variety of participants, ranging from brokerage firms who seek favorable
trade executions on behalf of clients entering long-term investment positions or hedges
to proprietary firms who trade on a principal basis in pursuit of short-term profit
opportunities.”); RICHARD HAYNES & JOHN S. ROBERTS, CFTC, AUTOMATED TRADING
IN FUTURES MARKETS 1 (Mar. 13, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@econo
micanalysis/documents/file/oce_automatedtrading.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV8B-PCZQ]
(“Recent studies on automated trading in domestic markets have found that often over
half of the trades on securities and futures exchanges make some use of algorithms . . . to
match trades, oversee certain order types (e.g.[,] stop orders)[,] and monitor general
market risk.”).
155. See HTG Capital Partners, LLC v. Doe, No. 15 C 02129, 2016 WL 612861, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2016). The plaintiff in HTG Capital Partners issued a non-party
subpoena to CME Group that operates CBOT and CMEX exchanges to identify the
anonymous counterparties allegedly involved in manipulative conduct, and provide the
relevant market data pertaining to the suspicious activity. Id. This subpoena was
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may at least improve the quality of anti-manipulative enforcement, since
in addressing allegations of manipulative conduct, the agency is arguably
better placed to access the market data and has expertise in policing
violations involving sophisticated forms of manipulative trading activity.
It will also increase efficiency in monitoring manipulative market
behavior, since the agency will receive more complaints, which will in
turn positively impact the ongoing research and studies to better
understand the conduct that is detrimental to the healthy functioning of
electricity markets.
However, the realization of the aforementioned positive externalities
will largely depend on whether the CFTC will have the necessary
resources and staff to duly and fairly address the increasing number of
complaints, which the agency will surely receive. Despite its very broad
jurisdiction over numerous markets and a wide range of trading activities,
the CFTC has a significantly lower budget in comparison to the SEC.
Additionally, the operational difficulties that may arise due to the
agency’s limited resources and staff may result in selective enforcement
and unfairness in regulating the relevant energy markets. Furthermore, as
the sole enforcer of the CEA, the CFTC’s involvement with energy
markets shall continue to cause tensions between FERC and the CFTC,
which may cause the agency to act more cautiously and selectively in
enforcement actions.
2. Potential Increase in and Importance of the Whistleblower Reports
In realizing the aforementioned efficiencies, an important vehicle for
the CFTC to monitor and police manipulative activity in commodities
markets will be the newly established whistleblower program.156 Under
the whistleblower program, the CFTC is authorized to grant monetary
awards to parties who provide the agency with original information
regarding manipulative conduct. The reported original information must
substantially contribute to the filing or litigation of a successful
challenged by the defendants on privacy grounds to which motion CME joined. Id.
Subsequently, the anonymous defendants moved to compel arbitration under CBOT rules
as required for the resolution of disputes arising between CBOT members. Id. The court
ultimately granted both defendant’s motion to proceed anonymously and the motion to
compel arbitration after in camera review of the relevant evidence documenting the
defendants’ membership to the CBOT. Id.
156. 7 U.S.C. § 26 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 165 (2016) (the rules and requirements of the
whistleblower program).
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enforcement action.157 Reports sent to the CFTC whistleblower office are
strictly confidential, and the whistleblowers will benefit from special
protections against potential retaliation. It is not necessary for a
whistleblower to have an employment relationship or other type of insider
status with the trader who is allegedly involved in manipulative conduct.
Any market observer, regardless of direct injuries suffered due to the
manipulative conduct, can qualify as a whistleblower. This broad
availability of whistleblower status can further solidify the agency’s
position as a central informational hub, since the whistleblower awards
may provide compensation to some extent for the injuries a market
participant has suffered from the manipulative conduct. It may also
further encourage independent market participants and institutional
traders to monetize the important information they may have in relation
to suspicious patterns in the market.158 In fact, some of the first successful
spoofing cases were initiated by whistleblower reports, confirming the
feasibility of the new regime so long as the CFTC has the means and
resources to properly study and respond to whistleblower reports.159
CONCLUSION
The virtual suspension of private rights of action in relation to the
exempted energy markets cannot be justified under regulatory costeffectiveness grounds (as a prevention of double regulation) as popularly
voiced before Congress and the agency. To the contrary, the lack of
private enforcement as a market discipline tool in the exempted energy
markets, which consist of the majority of U.S. electricity grids, inhibits

157. 17 C.F.R. § 165.14 (2016). The monetary award’s value will vary between ten
and thirty percent of the monetary sanctions successfully imposed in the resulting judicial
or administrative action depending on various factors such as the quality of the original
information and its contribution to the bringing of a successful enforcement action. Id. §
165.8.
158. See generally Matthew Leising & Janan Hanna, Can a $24 Billion Hedge Fund
Blow the Whistle? Citadel Thinks So, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2016-04-29/can-a-24-billion-hedge-fund-blow-the-whistlecitadel-thinks-so [https://perma.cc/GJG7-VMMU].
159. Consent Order, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-3398 (E.D. Ill.
Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documen
ts/legalpleading/enfsaraoorder111416.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3AU-VHZU].
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the important reform efforts in the energy markets.160 Indeed, sole
regulation by FERC is likely to cause the electricity markets to lag behind
the various market reforms promulgated in the CEA. The regulatory
framework of FERC falls short of the heightened standards introduced by
Dodd-Frank in relation to trading in the commodities markets.
However, the CFTC’s retreat is also an opportunity for the agency to
prioritize fully utilizing its own enforcement capacity. CFTC’s new
whistleblower program provides an important conduit and monetary
incentive for private individuals to contribute in the enforcement process,
and greater public awareness in this regard will increase compliance
standards. Without the availability of a private right of action, the CFTC
will be also in a more advantageous position to exert direct control over
the developing case law involving commodities market manipulation.

160. See Bradley J. McAlllister, Prioritizing Demand Response: How Federal
Legislation and Technological Innovation Changed the Electricity Supply Market and
the Need to Revitalize FERC Order 745, 15 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL’Y 162, 162 (2015)
(“The wholesale electric power network, or grid, delivers the product on which modern
life depends, but it is the last major network to hold out against fundamental change. Over
the past ten years, the federal government has committed billions of dollars to update the
nation’s grid. These updates are redefining the way electric power is sold and creating
business opportunities for new entrants in the power supply market. However, new
entrants are facing strong opposition from traditional power utilities and independent
power producers.” (citations omitted)).

